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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
This case arises from the sale of residential realty in 
Florida. Plaintiffs, Jose and Rosa Rolo and Dr. William and 
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Rosanne Tenerelli, purchased lots and homes from General 
Development Corporation ("GDC") and its subsidiary GDV 
Financial, Inc. ("GDV"). They claim that they were deceived 
by a fraudulent marketing scheme which induced them to 
purchase residential lots and homes at inflated prices. This 
case and its related proceedings have a long and convoluted 
history. The present appeal is the third time this Court has 
considered this case. 
 
Plaintiffs originally filed suit in 1989 in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging claims 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1961 et seq (RICO), the Interstate Land 
Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1701 et seq ("Land 
Sales Act"), federal securities laws, and common law fraud 
against thirty-five named defendants. They also sought to 
represent a putative class consisting of all persons who 
purchased houses or homesites from GDC or GDV over the 
period from 1957 to 1990 and who are members of the 
North Port Out-of-State Lot Owners Association ("NPA"). 
 
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims in their 
entirety. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 845 F. 
Supp. 182 (D.N.J. 1993). The court held that plaintiffs' 
RICO claims were time-barred; plaintiffs had failed to plead 
adequately the existence of a RICO conspiracy; and they 
had failed to satisfy the essential requirements for pleading 
aider and abettor liability under RICO. Although the court 
found that plaintiffs' complaint stated claims under the 
Land Sales Act for aiding and abetting against some 
defendants, but not others, all of their Land Sales Act 
Claims were time barred. The district court dismissed 
plaintiffs' Securities Act claims on the grounds that the 
sales contracts and mortgage notes were not securities 
within the meaning of S 10 of the 1934 Act or Rule 10b-5. 
Having dismissed all of plaintiffs' federal claims, the court 
declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over plaintiffs' 
common law fraud claims. Finally, the district court denied 
plaintiffs' Motion to file a Second Amended Complaint that 
would have restructured and reformulated their action. 
Following a remand for reconsideration of plaintiffs' claims 
in light of our decision in Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks 
Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995), the district court 
 
                                11 
  
reaffirmed its dismissal of each of plaintiffs' claims and its 
denial of further leave to amend the complaint. Rolo v. City 
Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 897 F. Supp. 826 (D.N.J. 
1995). 
 
The present appeal is from the district court's decision on 
remand. Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in 
dismissing their RICO claims and abused its discretion by 
denying them leave to amend their complaint. We conclude 
that there were adequate grounds to dismiss each of 
plaintiffs' RICO claims and that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs further leave to 
amend their complaint. Accordingly, we will affirm the 
district court's decision on remand in its entirety. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. The Fraudulent Scheme 
 
Plaintiffs allege that GDC and GDV engaged in a 
fraudulent marketing scheme to sell real estate in violation 
of several federal criminal and civil statutes. The First 
Amended Complaint alleges that GDC improved only a 
small portion of the 1,000 square mile tract of land that it 
owned in Florida and that it had no intention of developing 
the land further. Prospective purchasers were told, 
however, that the entire tract would be developed. 
According to plaintiffs, GDC targeted unsophisticated 
purchasers, particularly those who spoke English only as a 
second language. Prospective purchasers were invited to 
attend lavish "investment seminars" at which GDC 
represented that the value of the real estate continually 
appreciated, that there was a good resale market for the 
lots and houses, and that the real estate was an excellent 
investment. The Complaint further alleges that much 
information was concealed from prospective purchasers, 
including the very low resale value of the lots, the artificial 
nature of the original sale prices of the lots, and the fact 
that most purchasers defaulted within two years, allowing 
GDC to cancel their contracts and resell the same lots over 
and over again. According to plaintiffs, similar tactics were 
also used to sell homes to those who already owned lots. 
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B. The Defendants 
 
The Amended Complaint names thirty-five defendants 
and classifies them according to the nature of their 
participation in the allegedly fraudulent scheme, placing 
some defendants in more than one category. The district 
court adopted this classification and divided the defendants 
into six categories:1 City Defendants, Inside Director 
Defendants, Director Defendants, Financing Defendants, 
Mortgagee Defendants and Lot Contract Defendants. The 
Complaint did not specifically include the lawfirm Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore ("Cravath") or David Ormsby, a Cravath 
partner, in any of these categories. The Complaint alleges 
that in rendering legal services to GDC and GDV, Cravath 
and Ormsby assisted the defendants in concealing their 
fraudulent scheme. Ormsby also acted as GDC's secretary 
from 1985-1988. 
 
The City Defendants include City Investing Company, 
later City Trust, ("City"), its subsidiaries and several of its 
directors.2 The Complaint alleges that City had an 
ownership interest in and controlled GDC. After the sales 
fraud was initially discovered, the City Defendants 
attempted to distance themselves from GDC. With the 
assistance of Cravath, City Investing sought to disassociate 
itself from GDC by transferring itself into a liquidating 
trust, City Trust. The City Defendants and Cravath 
arranged for City to sell 62% of GDC stock to the public 
and retain 38% in City Trust for later distribution. GDC 
also borrowed in excess of $100 million,3  which was 
remitted to City as a dividend. 
 
The Inside Director Defendants include Edwin Hatch, 
Marshall Manley, Eben Pyne and George Scharffenberger, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Complaint also includes a seventh group, the "John Doe" 
Defendants, those individuals who were involved in the alleged 
conspiracy but who were not known to the appellants. 
 
2. Specifically, the City Defendants include: City Trust, George 
Scharffenberger, Marshall Manley, Edwin Hatch, Eben Pyne, Ambase 
Corp., The Home Insurance Co., Carteret Bancorp, Inc., and Carteret 
Savings Bank, FA. 
 
3. It is unclear from the district court's opinion who lent this money to 
GDC. See Rolo, 845 F. Supp. at 204. 
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individuals who served as directors of GDC and City Trust 
for various periods from September 1985 onwards. The 
Director Defendants, Reubin O'D. Askew, Howard L. Clark, 
Jr., Charles J. Simons, and Peter R. Brinkerhoff, are 
persons who served as "outside directors" of GDC for 
various periods dating from September 1985. Also included 
in this category are David F. Brown and Robert F. Ehrling, 
who served as both officers and directors of GDC during 
this period. Both Brown and Ehrling were convicted of 
criminal charges in connection with their involvement in 
the fraudulent scheme. Their convictions were 
subsequently reversed on appeal. See infra. The Complaint 
alleges that the Inside Director Defendants along with the 
Director Defendants controlled the City Defendants and 
used them in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme. 
 
The Financing Defendants include banks and financial 
institutions,4 who provided a variety of financial services to 
the other defendants. Some, for example, underwrote the 
$125,000,000 in notes issued by GDC in its 1988 public 
offering. Others loaned GDC money and extended credit to 
the company. Another "warehoused" new GDV mortgages 
until they could be pooled and sold, while also lending GDV 
money using these mortgages as collateral. The Complaint 
alleges that these defendants knew or should have known 
of GDC's sales fraud. 
 
The mortgagee defendants, including the Federal National 
Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") and a number 
of private institutions,5 purchased pools of mortgages on 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The First Amended Complaint lists seven entities under the heading 
"Financing Conspirators." These entities are: Southeast Bank, N.A., 
PaineWebber Inc., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., The 
Prudential Insurance Company of America, Citicorp Real Estate, Inc., 
National Bank of Canada and First National Bank of Boston. 
 
5. The First Amended Complaint lists nine entities under the heading of 
"Mortgagee Conspirators." In addition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
allegations were made against the following institutions: Chase Federal 
Bank, FSB, Citizens and Southern Trust Co., N.A. n/k/a NationsBank 
Trust Co., Secor Bank, FSB n/k/a Regions Bank of Louisiana, The Home 
Insurance Co., Carteret Bancorp, Inc., Carteret Savings Bank, FA and 
Prudential. The FDIC also appeared as successor to the Resolution Trust 
Corporation in its capacity as receiver of Carteret Savings Bank, FA. 
 
                                14 
  
GDC houses. The Complaint alleges that these defendants 
knew or recklessly disregarded information that the GDC 
mortgages were overvalued. The Complaint also alleges that 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stopped purchasing GDV 
mortgages in 1985 because GDV's practices did not meet 
their standards, but that these defendants permitted GDV 
to repurchase the mortgages through a confidential 
agreement. In addition, they did not strip GDV of its 
privileges to sell mortgages under the Federal Home 
Mortgage Act. 
 
The Lot Contract Defendants,6 purchased pools of 
monthly payments due to GDC from the sale of residential 
property in Florida. Some of these defendants authorized 
GDC to service their contracts, including collection from 
and negotiations with the lot owners. Others collected their 
payments from owners directly. Under GDC's agreements 
with these defendants, substitution pools were used as a 
security. When a contract or note went into default, GDC 
would replace it with a performing contract. Thus, these 
defendants incurred no losses from defaults and had no 
incentive to ensure that loans reflected the true value of the 
property. The Complaint alleges that these defendants had 
conducted extensive financial review of GDC and knew or 
should have known of GDC's fraudulent scheme, but chose 
to remain silent in order to protect their own interests. 
 
The defendants must also be divided into two additional 
categories, the primary and secondary defendants. The 
primary defendants are those defendants who, plaintiffs 
allege, participated in the operation and management of the 
affairs of GDC through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
The primary defendants are City Trust, George 
Scharffenberger, Marshall Manley, Edwin Hatch, Eben 
Pyne, David F. Brown, and Robert F. Ehrling. All of the 
remaining defendants are categorized as secondary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The Lot Contract Defendants include the following entities: Oxford 
First Corp. and the Oxford Finance Companies, Inc., Greyhound 
Financial Corporation, StanChart Business Credit, Inc., Lloyds Bank, 
PLC, Harbor Federal Savings and Loan Association, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., National Bank of Canada, Citicorp Real Estate, 
Inc. and First National Bank of Boston. 
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defendants, who, it is alleged, aided and abetted the pattern 
of racketeering activity devised and controlled by the 
primary defendants. The plaintiffs allege that the actions of 
the secondary defendants are also in violation of RICO. 
 
C. Procedural History 
 
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on August 8, 1989, 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey against GDC and its subsidiary, GDV, asserting 
claims under RICO, S 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 and Rule 10b-5, the Land Sales Act, various state 
RICO statutes, and breach of fiduciary obligations. On 
September 7, 1989, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, 
adding claims for breach of contract and fraud. 
 
Defendants moved to dismiss the First Amended 
Complaint, and in January 1990 the district court 
dismissed the case in its entirety finding that plaintiffs had 
failed to plead fraud with the particularity required by Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs were given 120 days in which to 
file a second amended complaint. Before plaintiffs filed their 
amended complaint, on April 16, 1990, the case was 
administratively terminated because GDC had filed a 
petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. 
 
In November 1990, plaintiffs filed the present action. As 
in their earlier action, plaintiffs allege that the defendants 
participated in a fraudulent marketing scheme in violation 
of several federal criminal and civil statutes. 7 Although 
plaintiffs listed GDC and GDV as defendants in this action, 
they did not serve either company with a copy of the 
summons or the complaint. Rolo v. General Development 
Corp., 949 F.2d 695, 698 (3d Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs asserted 
before the district court their intention "to delete all 
references to GDC and GDV as defendants." Rolo v. General 
Dev. Corp., Civ. Action No. 90-4420, slip op. at 15 (D.N.J. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Specifically, plaintiffs assert claims underS 10(b) of the Securities 
and 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78j, the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1964, and the Interstate Land 
Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1703(a), as well as common law 
fraud claims. The district court had jurisdiction over the statutory 
claims 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. S 78aa, 18 U.S.C. S 1964, and 15 U.S.C. S 1719, 
and exercised pendent jurisdiction over the common law claims. 
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April 26, 1990). Accordingly, neither the district court nor 
this Court, in its 1991 decision, treated GDC or GDV as 
defendants in this case. Rolo, 949 F.2d at 698. 
 
About two weeks after the filing of this case, plaintiffs 
filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court, on behalf 
of all members of the NPA, a group of more than 5,000 
individual who had purchased property from GDC and its 
agents. Id. In support of their claim, plaintiffs reiterated the 
allegations detailed in their complaint, which was attached 
to their proof of claim. Id. During the bankruptcy 
proceedings, the bankruptcy judge denied class treatment 
of plaintiffs' claims and approved settlements in which over 
60,000 homesite and house purchasers participated. See In 
re GDC, No. 90-12231-BKC-AJC, slip op. at 1, 6 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 1991). 
 
Proceedings in this case were stayed by the district court 
from December 1990 until March 1993, pending disposition 
of GDC and GDV's bankruptcy proceedings. Rolo , 949 F.2d 
at 699. In April 1991 the district court denied 
reconsideration of its stay order and "further directed that 
the action be stayed on the terms set forth in the December 
Order pending the resolution of the criminal cases against 
Brown and Ehrling."8 Id. The following month, the district 
court also stayed plaintiffs' request for a preliminary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Prior to the filing of this case GDC, its Chairman David Brown, and 
President Robert Ehrling, were indicted for their involvement in this 
scheme. GDC pled guilty to fraud and established a $169 million fund 
to pay its customers. It also filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. 
United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1996). A civil 
action has also been brought by the United States against GDC. No. 90- 
0879-Civ. Nesbitt (S.D. Fla.). For their participation in the scheme, 
Brown and Ehrling were charged with 73 total counts of mail fraud, 
interstate transportation of persons in furtherance of a fraud, and 
conspiracy. Brown was convicted on one conspiracy count and Ehrling 
was convicted on 39 counts. Id. Both received jail sentences for their 
participation in the conspiracy. On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed their convictions finding that "insufficient 
evidence was presented that a scheme reasonably calculated to deceive 
persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension was devised." Id. at 
1553. Both Brown and Ehrling are named as defendants in the action 
presently before this Court. 
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injunction to bar Ambase and City Investment from 
liquidating and distributing their assets. Id. These stay 
orders were the subject of the first appeal before this Court.9 
 
On May 13, 1991, plaintiffs filed their First Amended 
Complaint, which no longer named either GDC or GDV as 
a defendant, but added a number of additional defendants. 
This complaint also dropped plaintiffs' claim for breach of 
contract. Later the same month, the defendants moved to 
dismiss the First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6). In June, plaintiffs voluntarily 
withdrew their claims for breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith, negligence and negligent misrepresentation. 
 
In their response to the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, 
plaintiffs first raised their challenge to the 
enterprise/person distinction under RICO. Although this 
argument raised allegations not contained in the amended 
complaint, the plaintiffs did not formally request further 
leave to amend the complaint. In considering the plaintiffs' 
response, the district court treated these amended RICO 
allegations as a Second Amended Complaint. In a lengthy 
Opinion and Order dated December 27, 1993, the district 
court granted defendant's motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), and granted the motions to dismiss pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction of 
Scharffenberger, Manley, Hatch, Pyne, Askew, Brinkerhoff, 
Clark and Simons. The dismissal of all of plaintiffs' claims 
rendered the Motion for Class Certification moot. The court 
dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint without granting leave to 
file a further amended complaint. Plaintiffs appealed the 
dismissal of their claims to this Court. Following oral 
argument, on November 8, 1994, we issued a Judgment 
Order affirming the decision of the district court for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. On appeal, we held that the district court's order staying this action 
pending final resolution of the related bankruptcy and criminal 
proceedings was not an appealable order under the collateral-order 
doctrine. Rolo, 949 F.2d at 700. Moreover, we concluded that plaintiffs 
could not demonstrate exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant 
the grant of mandamus relief. Id. at 702. In contrast, however, the order 
staying consideration of the request for preliminary injunction could be 
appealed interlocutorily, and the district court erred in deferring 
consideration of the merits of the requested injunction. Id. at 703-04. 
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"substantially the reasons" set out in the district court 
opinion. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 66 F. 
3d 312 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
On November 18, 1994, plaintiffs filed a Petition for 
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc. Their 
Petition requested this Court to reconsider its 
jurisprudence on the person/enterprise distinction, which 
was applied to claims brought under RICO. See , e.g., Hirsch 
v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that defendant corporation could not be liable 
under S 1962 in that "the `person' subject to liability cannot 
be the same entity as the `enterprise' "). While plaintiffs' 
Petition was pending, another panel of this Court decided 
Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 
(3d Cir. 1995), holding that under RICO, officers or 
employees "may properly be held liable as persons 
managing the affairs of their corporation as an enterprise." 
46 F.3d at 261. This holding endorsed the position taken by 
plaintiffs in their Petition for Rehearing. By Order dated 
April 4, 1995, we granted plaintiffs' Petition, vacated our 
earlier Judgment Order, vacated the order of dismissal 
issued by the district court, and remanded the case to the 
district court for reconsideration in light of the decision in 
Jaguar Cars. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 
No. 94-5057, 94-5058, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 1995). 
We did not retain jurisdiction over the case. 
 
Following the remand, the parties disputed whether 
reconsideration in light of the holding in Jaguar Cars was 
necessary as there were other, independent grounds to 
support dismissal of all of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs also 
advised the district court that they intended to seek leave 
to file a further amended complaint, to add and drop 
parties, and to restate their claims in light of Jaguar Cars. 
By letter dated April 12, 1995, the district court requested 
briefing from the parties regarding the appropriate actions 
for the court to take on reconsideration. As requested by 
the district court, the parties filed their initial briefs on 
June 1, 1995. The following day, plaintiffs also served their 
formal motion for leave to serve a proposed Second 
Amended Complaint10 and to add and drop parties. By 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Although the district court had treated certain allegations contained 
in the plaintiffs' response to the Motion to Dismiss as a Second Amended 
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letter dated June 8, 1995, the district court adjourned the 
Motion for leave to serve an amended complaint until the 
court had completed the reconsideration mandated by this 
Court. 
 
On August 24, 1995, the district court once again 
dismissed this case in its entirety, holding all other grounds 
for dismissing plaintiffs' claims were unaffected by Jaguar 
Cars. Rolo, 897 F. Supp. at 833. The district court also 
dismissed plaintiffs' Motion to file a Second Amended 
Complaint and to add and drop parties. Id. Within ten days 
after the court's final order, plaintiffs moved for relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, seeking leave to serve their proposed Second 
Amended Complaint and to add and/or intervene additional 
parties. Following oral argument on the motion, on October 
23, 1995, the district court ruled from the bench, denying 
relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). On November 1, 1995, 
plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal from the district court's 
decisions dismissing the complaint and denying post- 
judgment relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). Specifically, 
plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their RICO claims 
and from the denial of leave to amend the complaint. 
 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291, as the appeal arises from afinal decision of 
the district court dismissing all of the remaining claims of 
the First Amended Complaint, dismissing plaintiffs' motion 
for leave to serve a Second Amended Complaint, and 
denying plaintiffs' motion, pursuant to Rule 60(b), for leave 
to serve a further amended complaint. The district court 
had subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' federal 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and exercised pendent 
jurisdiction over their state claims.11  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Complaint, the proposed Amended Complaint would have been the 
Second Amended Complaint, and we will refer to it as such in this 
Opinion. 
 
11. This case was filed prior to the enactment of the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1367 in 1990, which combined the 
concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. See In re: Prudential Ins. 
Co. America Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 
1998 WL 409156 at *11 (3d Cir. July 23, 1998). 
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Defendants contend, however, that we may not hear this 
appeal because plaintiffs did not file a timely notice of 
appeal. Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 
days after the date of entry of the order appealed, but that 
if a party files a "timely motion" for relief under Rule 60(b), 
the time for appeals runs from the entry of the order 
disposing of the motion. In this case, the district court 
dismissed plaintiffs' claims on August 24, 1995. Plaintiffs 
moved for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) within the 10 day 
time limit provided by Rule 4(a)(4)(F) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. The district court denied their Rule 
60(b) Motion on October 23, 1995, and plaintiffsfiled their 
notice of appeal on November 1, 1995, within the 30 day 
time limit provided by the rule. 
 
Defendants assert that plaintiffs' motion was not properly 
cognizable pursuant to Rule 60(b) and therefore the motion 
did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. Defendants 
argue that the Rule 60(b) Motion sought only to persuade 
the district court to reconsider issues that it had already 
fully considered and rejected. Defendants correctly state 
that a request for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) cannot be 
used as a substitute for an appeal. Martinez-McBean v. 
Government of the V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977). 
See also Union Switch & Signal v. United Electrical, Radio & 
Machine Workers of America, Local 610, 900 F.2d 608, 615 
(3d Cir. 1990) (finding that a party's characterization of 
their motion is not dispositive, instead the court must look 
to the "purpose the motion seeks to achieve"). In response, 
plaintiffs contend that they filed a Rule 60(b) Motion rather 
than an immediate appeal because they believed that the 
district court had construed this Court's mandate as 
precluding consideration of their Motion to file a Second 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs considered the change in the 
law following the original dismissal of their case coupled 
with the district court's narrow construction of our 
mandate to constitute "exceptional circumstances" meriting 
review pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). 
 
Although plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) Motion was ultimately 
unsuccessful, it was not so deficient that it was not 
cognizable pursuant to Rule 60. Plaintiffs could reasonably 
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believe that the district court had dismissed plaintiffs' 
Request for Leave to file an amended complaint because the 
district judge believed that our mandate had limited review 
to the issues created by the decision in Jaguar Cars and 
that a Rule 60 motion might offer broader relief. Plaintiffs' 
position is buttressed by the fact that within a relatively 
short time frame, controlling precedent was reversed after 
the prior dismissal had been affirmed by judgment order, 
but before completion of their appeal, which concluded 
when the prior dismissal was vacated on rehearing. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs' notice of appeal was timelyfiled and 
their present appeal is properly before us. 
 
We have plenary review over plaintiffs' appeal from the 
dismissal of their action. Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 
1411 (3d Cir. 1993). We may review the district court's 
dismissal of their motion for leave to amend the complaint 
and denial of their motion for post-judgment relief under 
Rule 60(b) for abuse of discretion only. In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 
1997); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Forest Grove, Inc., 33 F.3d 
284, 288 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Denial of Leave to Amend 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the district court must have 
misconstrued this Court's April 4, 1995, mandate 
remanding the case to the district court for reconsideration 
in light of the decision in Jaguar Cars because, they 
contend, it refused to consider their motion for leave to 
serve a Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs also argue 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
their Rule 60(b) Motion seeking leave to amend. Wefind 
that the district court neither misunderstood our mandate 
nor abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs further leave 
to amend the complaint. 
 
Our mandate was designed to offer the district court 
broad flexibility to reconsider its earlier ruling in light of 
our decision in Jaguar Cars. Our April 4, 1995, Order 
provided in pertinent part: 
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       The petition for rehearing is granted, the orders of the 
       district court from which the appeal were taken are 
       vacated, and the matters are remanded to the district 
       court for reconsideration in light of Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. 
       Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995). 
       We do not retain jurisdiction. 
 
Rolo, No. 94-5057, 94-5058, slip op. at 2. The district court 
was free to reconsider its original ruling, dismissing the 
request for leave to amend, and also to consider the new 
motion for leave to amend, in light of the decision in Jaguar 
Cars. 
 
Plaintiffs contend that the district court thought that 
under this Court's mandate, it could not consider their 
Motion for Leave to Amend. The district court's August 24, 
1995, Opinion states that plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to 
Amend is "dismissed." Rolo, 897 F. Supp. at 833. The court 
wrote, "the remand order did not contemplate that plaintiffs 
be allowed to reconstitute and restructure their action 
through the vehicle of an amended complaint and the 
addition and deletion of parties" and that "the motion to 
serve a second amended and supplemental complaint and 
to add and drop parties should not be considered." Id. at 
827-28. On the other hand, the district court discussed the 
proposed amended complaint, noting that it would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the claims and 
concluding that it did "not believe that the Third Circuit 
intended the reconsideration to be on the basis of an 
amendment to an already much amended complaint." Id. at 
831. The district judge did not "consider the mandate as 
requiring consideration of the Proposed Complaint or any 
other proposed amended complaint." Id. at 832. Similarly, 
at oral argument on plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) Motion, the Judge 
stated, "I concluded that the remand order did not require 
and the circumstances did not warrant hearing a motion 
for leave to file a further amended and supplemental 
complaint and to substitute new plaintiffs." Rolo v. City 
Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, No. 90-4420 slip op. at *24 
(D.N.J. Oct. 23, 1995) (transcript of hearing denying 
plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion). 
 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the actions 
of the district court are consistent with this Court's 
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mandate. The court considered the impact of Jaguar Cars 
and determined that, in light of the procedural posture of 
the case, our mandate did not require that leave to amend 
be granted when there were other adequate grounds for 
upholding the decision to dismiss the complaint. 
 
In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying plaintiffs leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) 
or Rule 60(b)(6). Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that a party may seek leave of the court 
to amend a pleading and that such leave "shall be freely 
given when justice so requires." The decision whether to 
grant or to deny a motion for leave to amend rests within 
the sound discretion of the district court. Howze v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 1212 (3d Cir. 1984). 
The Supreme Court has stated, however, that, "[i]n the 
absence of any apparent or declared reason -- such as 
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment 
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party 
by virtue of allowance of the amendment, etc. -- the leave 
sought should, as the rules require, be `freely given.' " 
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The same 
standard applies when considering a request to add or drop 
parties. In contrast, relief under Rule 60(b) is extraordinary 
and requires a "showing of exceptional circumstances." 
Marshall v. Board of Education, 575 F.2d 417, 425-26 (3d 
Cir. 1978). 
 
In this case, the plaintiffs' proposed Second Amended 
Complaint primarily seeks to replead facts and arguments 
that could have been pled much earlier in the proceedings. 
In Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Company, 39 F.3d 70 (3d 
Cir. 1994), affirming the district court's refusal to grant 
leave to amend, we reasoned: 
 
       . . . . as the district court stated, "three attempts at a 
       proper pleading is enough" and a "plaintiff has to 
       carefully consider the allegations to be placed in a 
       complaint before it is filed." [Plaintiff] is not seeking to 
       add claims it inadvertently omitted from its prior 
       complaints or which it did not know about earlier. 
       Rather [plaintiff] is modifying the allegations in hopes 
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       of remedying factual deficiencies in its prior pleadings, 
       even to the point of contradicting its prior pleadings. 
 
Id. at 74. This description is equally applicable to the 
procedural posture of this case. Plaintiffs have not only had 
the opportunity to file an amended complaint, but the 
district court also accepted certain allegations contained in 
their response to defendants' motion to dismiss as a Second 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs have already had ample 
opportunity to plead their allegations properly and 
completely. 
 
The duration of this case, and the substantial effort and 
expense of resolving defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First 
Amended Complaint also support the district court's denial 
of leave to amend. Although the district court did not make 
specific factual findings on this question, these factors 
could constitute undue delay, bad faith or prejudice to the 
defendants. See Adams v. Gould, 739 F.2d 858, 863-64 (3d 
Cir. 1984). Finally, in our Judgment Order of November 8, 
1994, which was later vacated, we ruled that the district 
court had not erred in denying plaintiffs leave to amend. 
Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, Nos. 94-5057, 
94-5058, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 1994). Because the 
new legal analysis established in Jaguar Cars does not form 
the basis for plaintiffs' requested amendments, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by summarily dismissing 
plaintiffs' renewed Motion for Leave to Amend. 
 
B. Statute of Limitations 
 
In its original opinion dismissing this case, the district 
court concluded that plaintiffs' RICO claims against the 
primary defendants could not survive because plaintiffs had 
"failed to plead that the RICO `persons' (GDC's officers, 
directors and controlling shareholders) were separate and 
distinct from the `enterprise' (GDC)." Rolo, 897 F. Supp. at 
832. In the alternative, the district court found that these 
claims could also be dismissed on the grounds that they 
were time barred. Id. Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting claims 
under RICO were dismissed because they did not meet the 
"operation or management" test of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 
507 U.S. 170 (1993), and for "failure to plead anything 
more than general and conclusory allegations of knowledge 
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or participation in a scheme." Rolo, 897 F. Supp. at 833. 
Following our decision in Jaguar Cars, the 
enterprise/person distinction no longer constituted a 
grounds for dismissing their RICO claims against the 
primary defendants. The district court found that other, 
independent reasons supported dismissal of all plaintiffs' 
RICO claims. The court concluded that plaintiffs' RICO 
claims could be dismissed as to all defendants on the 
grounds that they were not timely filed. Rolo, 897 F. Supp. 
at 833. In addition, the grounds for the dismissal of the 
aiding and abetting claims against the secondary 
defendants were unaffected by the decision in Jaguar Cars. 
Id. 
 
Although RICO does not contain an express statute of 
limitations for civil actions, the Supreme Court has held 
that RICO claims are subject to the four year statute of 
limitations applicable to civil enforcement actions under the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15b. Agency Holding Corp. v. 
Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 152-56 (1987). 
Accordingly, to be timely, plaintiffs' claims can have 
accrued no earlier than November 8, 1986, for the claims 
contained in the original complaint and May 13, 1987, for 
those claims contained in the First Amended Complaint. 
 
At the time plaintiffs filed both their original complaint 
and their First Amended Complaint, this Court recognized 
the "last predicate act" method for calculating the accrual 
of civil RICO claims. Under the "last predicate act" method 
of accrual: 
 
       Civil RICO claims accrue at the time when the plaintiff 
       knew or should have known that the elements of a civil 
       RICO action existed. However, if further predicate acts 
       occur that are part of the same pattern of racketeering, 
       regardless of whether they injure the plaintiff or if the 
       plaintiff suffers further injury from a predicate act that 
       is part of the same pattern of racketeering, even if that 
       predicate act occurred outside the limitations period, 
       the statute of limitations begins to run from the date 
       that the plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
       last such act or the last such injury. 
 
Davis v. Grusemeyer, 996 F.2d 617, 623 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted). Relying in part upon this accrual 
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method, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in 
concluding that their RICO claims were not timely filed. 
 
During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court 
held that the last predicate act accrual method was not a 
proper interpretation of the RICO statute of limitations. 
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 117 S. Ct. 1984 (1997). The 
Court declined, however, to determine which of the 
remaining accrual methods is the appropriate one. 
 
The accrual method that provides plaintiffs with the 
longest period of time in which to file their claims is the 
"injury and pattern discovery" method, which has also been 
applied in this Circuit. See Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 
863 F.2d 1125, 1130 (3d Cir. 1988). Under this method, 
plaintiffs have four years in which to file suit from the time 
that they discover or should have discovered either their 
injury or the defendants' pattern of racketeering activity. 
 
Given that plaintiffs purchased their properties in the 
1970s, it seems likely that they should have discovered the 
defendants' allegedly fraudulent activities prior to 1986 or 
1987, when their complaints were filed.12 We will not, 
however, address this issue directly as other adequate 
grounds exist for dismissing the plaintiffs' RICO claims. 
 
C. Aiding and Abetting Liability 
 
The claims against the vast majority of defendants are 
secondary claims, contentions that these defendants 
assisted the primary defendants in defrauding the plaintiffs. 
The district court dismissed the complaint as to these 
defendants, because the plaintiffs had failed to plead that 
the alleged aiders and abettors had "participated in the 
operation or management" of the alleged enterprise, as 
required by the Supreme Court's decision in Reves v. Ernst 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In addition, plaintiffs' claim that they could not have discovered 
their 
claims due to the fraudulent concealment of the defendants is 
unavailing. In Klehr, the Court clarified that in order to use fraudulent 
concealment to toll the statute of limitations, plaintiffs must have been 
reasonably diligent in protecting their interests. 117 S. Ct. at 1993. 
Whether or not plaintiffs should have discovered their claims prior to 
1986, there is no evidence that plaintiffs were reasonably diligent in 
supervising the defendants' actions with regard to their property. 
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& Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993). Rolo, 897 F. Supp. at 
829. The district court also found that had the allegations 
of the Amended Complaint satisfied the Reves requirement, 
these allegations would be insufficient because they fail to 
meet the essential pleading requirements for aiding and 
abetting claims and are barred by RICO's four year statute 
of limitations. Id. (citing Walck v. American Stock Exchange, 
Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791 (3d Cir. 1982)). We will affirm the 
district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' RICO aiding and 
abetting claims without reaching either of the district 
court's grounds for dismissing these allegations because we 
are convinced that a private cause of action for aiding and 
abetting a RICO violation cannot survive the Supreme 
Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First 
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 
In Central Bank, the Supreme Court addressed the 
question of whether a private plaintiff may bring a cause of 
action for aiding and abetting under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, S 10(b). The Court's analysis began 
and ended with a review of the language of the statute. "It 
is inconsistent with the settled methodology inS 10(b) cases 
to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited 
by the statutory text." Id. at 177. Reasoning that the text of 
S 10(b) does not reach aiding and abetting a violation of 
S 10(b), the Court concluded that "the statute itself resolves 
the case." Id. at 177-78. The Court rejected the argument 
that Congress had intended to permit private actions for 
aiding and abetting, stating "Congress knew how to impose 
aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so." Id. at 
176. The Court explained, 
 
       Congress has not enacted a general civil aiding and 
       abetting statute . . .. [W]hen Congress enacts a statute 
       under which a person may sue and recover damages 
       from a private defendant for violation of some statutory 
       norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff 
       may also sue aiders and abettors. 
 
Id. at 181. The Court refused to entertain arguments based 
upon reference to general tort principles or the policy 
considerations supporting inference of a Rule 10b-5 aiding 
and abetting cause of action. Id. at 181, 188. 
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The Court also rejected the argument that a private 
cause of action for aiding and abetting in violation of S 10(b) 
could be implied by reference to 18 U.S.C. S 2, the criminal 
aiding and abetting statute. The Court wrote, 
 
       [W]hile it is true that an aider and abettor of a criminal 
       violation of any provision of the 1934 Act, including 
       S 10(b), violates 18 U.S.C. S 2, it does not follow that a 
       private civil aiding and abetting cause of action must 
       also exist. We have been quite reluctant to infer a 
       private right of action from a criminal prohibition alone 
       . . .. 
 
Id. at 190. Thus, the Court concluded that because the text 
of S 10(b) itself does not prohibit aiding and abetting, a 
private plaintiff may not maintain a suit for aiding and 
abetting in violation of S 10(b). 
 
We conclude that the same analysis controls our 
construction of the civil RICO provision, 18 U.S.C.S 1964. 
Section 1964(c) establishes a civil remedy in favor of "[a]ny 
person injured in his business or property by reason of a 
violation of section 1962." Like S 10(b), the text of S 1962 
itself contains no indication that Congress intended to 
impose private civil aiding and abetting liability under 
RICO. Criminal liability for aiding and abetting a violation 
of S 1962 is imposed by reference to the general aiding and 
abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. S 2. This provision has no 
application to private causes of action. See Central Bank of 
Denver, 511 U.S. at 181-82. Thus, reference to 18 U.S.C. 
S 2 cannot provide the basis for the imposition of civil 
liability for aiding and abetting a RICO violation. 
 
Similarly, despite the existence of cogent policy 
arguments in support of extending civil liability to aiders 
and abettors of RICO violations, under Central Bank of 
Denver, we must "interpret and apply the law as Congress 
has written it, and not [ ] imply private causes of action 
merely to effectuate the purported purposes of the statute." 
In re Lake States Commodities, Inc. 936 F. Supp. 1461, 
1475 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Because the text of the RICO statute 
does not encompass a private cause of action for aiding and 
abetting a RICO violation, "in accordance with the policies 
articulated in Central Bank of Denver", we have no 
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authority to imply one. Hayden v. Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison, 955 F. Supp. 248, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997); see also In re Lake States, 936 F. Supp. at 1475-76; 
Department of Economic Dev. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 924 
F. Supp. 449, 475-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). On this basis, we 
will affirm the district court's dismissal of the RICO claims 
against all of the secondary defendants. 
 
We reach this result despite our discussion of aiding and 
abetting liability in Jaguar Cars, a case decided after 
Central Bank of Denver. See 46 F.3d at 270. In Jaguar 
Cars, the opinion did not address the impact of Central 
Bank of Denver on earlier cases that had recognized a 
private cause of action for aiding and abetting under RICO. 
The decision in Jaguar Cars focused on whether there had 
been sufficient evidence to find the defendant liable for 
aiding and abetting a RICO violation. See 46 F.3d at 270. 
The parties did not challenge the existence of a cause of 
action for aiding and abetting, and we did not raise the 
issue sua sponte. Although, under this Court's Internal 
Operating Procedures, we are bound by, and lack the 
authority to overrule, a published decision by a prior panel, 
see I.O.P. 9.1, we conclude that the discussion of a private 
cause of action for aiding and abetting a RICO violation in 
Jaguar Cars does not control our analysis in this case. The 
decision in Central Bank of Denver was not called to the 
attention of the panel in Jaguar Cars, and the panel's 
opinion neither explicitly nor implicitly decided the impact 
of Central Bank of Denver on the continued availability of a 
private cause of action for aiding and abetting a RICO 
violation. 
 
D. Failure to Plead Fraud with the Requisite Particularity 
 
The Amended Complaint alleges that the primary 
defendants, those defendants who actually participated in 
the operation and management of the fraudulent scheme, 
committed mail and wire fraud as predicate racketeering 
acts. Because the Complaint alleges that these defendants 
participated in the operation or management of the 
racketeering enterprise, the allegations against the primary 
defendants conform with the requirements for liability 
under RICO established by Reves v. Ernst & Young. 
Originally, the district court dismissed these claims for 
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failure to plead that the RICO "persons" were separate and 
distinct from the RICO "enterprise." Rolo, 897 F. Supp. at 
829. Following the decision in Jaguar Cars, the district 
court reaffirmed its dismissal of these claims against the 
primary defendants, finding that they were time barred. Id. 
at 833. We will affirm the dismissal of these claims without 
reaching the statute of limitations question because 
plaintiffs' allegations fail to satisfy the pleading 
requirements established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
 
Rule 9(b) states, "In all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be 
stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally." Thus, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), plaintiffs must 
plead with particularity the "circumstances" of the alleged 
fraud. They need not, however, plead the "date, place or 
time" of the fraud, so long as they use an "alternative 
means of injecting precision and some measure of 
substantiation into their allegations of fraud." Seville Indus. 
Machinery v. Southmost Machinery, 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d 
Cir. 1984). The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide notice of 
the "precise misconduct" with which defendants are 
charged and to prevent false or unsubstantiated charges. 
Id. Courts should, however, apply the rule with some 
flexibility and should not require plaintiffs to plead issues 
that may have been concealed by the defendants. See 
Christidis v. First Pennsylvania Mortg. Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 
99 (3d Cir. 1983). 
 
In Seville, the plaintiff met this standard because the 
subject and nature of each alleged misrepresentation was 
adequately plead. 742 F.2d at 791. We found that, 
 
       Seville adequately satisfied the requirements of Rule 
       9(b) by incorporating into the complaint a list 
       identifying with great specificity the pieces of 
       machinery that were the subject of the alleged fraud 
       . . .. The Complaint sets forth the nature of the alleged 
       misrepresentations, and while it does not describe the 
       precise words used, each allegation of fraud adequately 
       describes the nature and subject of the alleged 
       misrepresentation. 
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Id. In contrast, in Saporito v. Combustion Engineering, 843 
F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. granted and judgment vacated 
on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049 (1989), the plaintiffs failed 
to satisfy this standard. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged 
that ". . . defendants and/or persons under their direction 
or control provided notice to certain C-E employees other 
than plaintiffs during the [options period], that C-E was in 
the process of planning and promulgating [a Voluntary 
Separation Incentive Plan]." Id. at 673. This Court held that 
their Complaint was deficient because it did not adequately 
allege who made the statements ("defendants and/or 
persons under their direction or control") or who received 
the allegedly fraudulent information ("certain C-E 
employees other than the plaintiffs"). Id. at 675. 
 
In this case, plaintiffs have alleged numerous 
misrepresentations, and the fraudulent scheme is described 
in some detail. For example, the Complaint alleges that 
"[d]uring standard sales presentations, the moderators 
acting for GDC would misrepresent the supply, demand 
and value of the lots" by stating that the prices for the lots 
would increase the following day and that the number of 
lots for sale had decreased due to prior purchases. 
Amended Complaint at P 84. The moderators also allegedly 
misrepresented GDC's intentions and abilities with regard 
to development of the communities. Amended Complaint at 
PP 82-115. Similarly, the Complaint alleges that in the trips 
sponsored by GDC to the communities, GDC "arranged 
with hotel staff to screen incoming telephone calls" and to 
"turn away calls from independent Realtors." Amended 
Complaint at P 123. 
 
While many of the allegations relating to the allegedly 
fraudulent scheme are quite detailed, the Complaint lacks 
any specific allegations about the presentations made to 
any of the named plaintiffs. The Complaint includes no 
information about the actual presentations made to either 
the Rolos or the Tenerellis, including who made the 
presentation, when it took place, or with reference to what 
property it was made. The same is true with regard to the 
allegedly fraudulent mailings. The content of the mailings is 
described in reasonably specific terms, but when, by whom, 
and to whom a mailing was sent, and the precise content 
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of each particular mailing are not detailed. The Complaint 
also includes some general allegations such as,"[a]t the 
time plaintiffs purchased their Lots, when they purchased 
houses from GDC, and thereafter, the material facts alleged 
in paragraphs 87 and 138 herein were unknown to them 
and were actively concealed from them by the defendants." 
Amended Complaint at P 143. It remains unclear, however, 
who misrepresented and concealed the information, when 
and how. For example, plaintiffs allege that GDC concealed 
its fraud through a Customer Service Office. It is unclear 
from the Complaint, however, whether the Rolos or 
Tenerellis ever contacted this office. The Complaint only 
alleges what happened to "most purchasers," "the vast 
majority of complaints" and what happened "typically." 
Amended Complaint at P 145. 
 
Under Rule 9(b), failure to plead fraud with particularity 
with respect to what happened to a specific plaintiff 
prevents the defendants from being able to prepare a 
defense as to this particular allegation of fraud. To link 
their own injuries to the alleged RICO enterprise, plaintiffs 
must allege what happened to them. At the least, this 
includes specific allegations as to which fraudulent tactics 
were used against them and should include some 
allegations of what was said to them to induce them to 
purchase their properties from GDC. Although the First 
Amended Complaint links the Rolos and Tenerellis to the 
scheme in a general way, as purchasers of GDC properties, 
the manner in which the fraudulent scheme allegedly 
caused them injury has not been adequately pled. Plaintiffs 
appear to have confused this complaint with a class action 
complaint.13 The class must, however, be certified before it 
may become a class action. Until the putative class is 
certified, the action is one between the Rolos, the Tenerellis 
and the defendants. Accordingly, the First Amended 
Complaint must be evaluated as to these particular 
plaintiffs. Because the Complaint fails to allege what 
actually happened to either the Rolos or the Tenerellis, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. For example, in one of the paragraphs alleging mail fraud, many 
individuals are listed as plaintiffs, including "Paul and Agnes Duncan." 
Amended Complaint at P 396. Paul and Agnes Duncan are not parties to 
this case. 
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plaintiffs have not pled fraud with the specificity required 
by Rule 9(b), and the district court's dismissal of their 
complaint as to the primary defendants will be affirmed on 
this basis.14 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint when they had 
already had ample opportunity to plead their claims fully. 
Nor did the district court err in dismissing plaintiffs' RICO 
claims. The claims against the secondary defendants, 
alleging liability for aiding and abetting a RICO conspiracy, 
cannot survive the Supreme Court's decision in Central 
Bank of Denver. Plaintiffs' claims against the primary 
defendants also fail because their allegations are not pled 
with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). Accordingly, we 
will affirm the district court's dismissal of this case in its 
entirety. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Because plaintiffs have already had ample opportunity to plead their 
allegations fully and in the proper form, we will not remand this case to 
the district court in order to provide them with a further opportunity to 
amend their defective complaint. Cf. Saporito, 843 F.2d at 675-76 
(remanding in order to provide plaintiffs with the opportunity to amend 
their complaint to provide greater specificity). 
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